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Abstract
This study explores whether an oath to honesty can reduce both shirking and lying among
crowd-sourced internet workers. Using a classic coin-flip experiment, we first confirm that a
substantial majority of Mechanical Turk workers both shirk and lie when reporting the num-
ber of heads flipped. We then demonstrate that lying can be reduced by first asking each
worker to swear voluntarily on his or her honor to tell the truth in subsequent economic
decisions. Even in this online, purely anonymous environment, the oath significantly
reduced the percent of subjects telling “big” lies (by roughly 27%), but did not affect shirking.
We also explore whether a truth-telling oath can be used as a screening device if imple-
mented after decisions have been made. Conditional on flipping response, MTurk shirkers
and workers who lied were significantly less likely to agree to an ex-post honesty oath. Our
results suggest oaths may help elicit more truthful behavior, even in online crowd-sourced
environments.
1 Introduction
Online labor markets have become increasingly popular. In social sciences research, for
instance, crowd-work platforms like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) offer important
advantages over the typical university student subject pool, including low cost, speed of data
collection, and access to a more heterogeneous pool of participants [1–3], although far from
being representative of the general population [4, 5]. Despite a more serious attrition problem
[6], a large body of evidence shows consistency in behavior between MTurk workers and stu-
dent subjects in multiple disciplines, including behavioral economics [7–9], psychology [10,
11], sociology [12], accounting [13], advertising [14] and political science [15]. Based on a
large replication study [16], hypothesize this robustness might be related to the homogeneity
of treatment effects measured in experiments in social sciences.
Nevertheless, there are concerns that the unique characteristics of online labor markets
increase the potential for dishonest and unethical behavior. The workforce is anonymous and
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transient [17] and is typically unmonitored [18]. Because workers operate remotely in uncon-
trolled settings, online work can weaken social ties with employers [19] and has the potential
for distractions such as cell phones [20] and multi-tasking [21]. Multiple studies have docu-
mented the prevalence of dishonest behavior on MTurk. This can manifest itself in multiple
ways [see, e.g., 22, for a survey] including misrepresenting whether a worker meets the eligibil-
ity criteria for participating in a task [23], rushing through the task so quickly that it is not pos-
sible to properly perform the task [24] or shirking by not paying attention [25].
Our study provides direct evidence on dishonesty in online labor markets thanks to a varia-
tion of the coin-tossing game [26–28]: we asked MTurk workers to flip a coin 10 times and
receive an additional 10 cents for each head observed. This design allows us to measure lying
at the aggregate level, by comparing the distribution of outcomes to the theoretical truthful dis-
tribution. We complement this aggregate measure of lying with an individual measure of
shirking, defined as answering the survey without performing the coin tossing task: we com-
bine observed response times and external coin tossing data to classify workers as shirkers
whenever their response was too quick to allow them to perform the required task. Consistent
with other studies, our results show that dishonesty—both shirking and lying—is prevalent on
MTurk: workers do lie, although not fully. Workers reported an average of 6.33 heads, which
is significantly different from the expected mean of 5 if all workers were truthful, but is also
much lower than the mean of 10 if all lied maximally. Shirking is widespread, with nearly half
(42.6%) of workers who completed the coin-flip task at a rate that was physically impossible.
The open question we address herein is whether a non-financial honesty oath works to
reduce dishonesty in crowd-working relationships. The solemn oath to honesty is an ancient
and time-tested mechanism designed to eliminate misbehavior by asking a person to commit
to the truth [29–32]. Using laboratory experiments, the oath has been shown to affect behavior
in multiple contexts, including the reduction of hypothetical bias in non-market valuation
[33–35], improving coordination in a strategic game with cheap talk [36] and increasing com-
pliance in tax evasion games [37]. Both [38] and [39] directly test the effect of an oath on
truth-telling in a lab setting with European university students, and show that the oath signifi-
cantly reduced lying in the lab. We provide evidence on the effectiveness of a freely signed
truth-telling oath in the field by assigning half the workers to an Oath treatment in which,
before the coin-flipping task, they are offered the possibility to take a voluntary solemn oath to
honesty.
Our results are threefold. First, while the oath slightly reduced shirking behavior (from 42%
to 40%), this change was not significant (p = 0.170). Unless stated otherwise, the p-values pro-
vided in the text are associated with one-tailed t-tests. Second, the oath did, however, result in
respondents spending almost 30 seconds more completing the survey (p = 0.002) which sug-
gests that the oath may have induced them to be more thoughtful and accurate in their
responses. Third, the oath caused a modest (4.2%) reduction in the average number of heads
flipped (6.06 vs. 6.33 in the baseline treatment with no oath, p = 0.008) and a large (27%)
reduction in the frequency of pay-off maximizing reports (12.9% vs 17.8%, p = 0.006). The
oath thus causes workers to answer survey questions more thoughtfully and truthfully, and
could be an effective and practical tool to elicit more accurate survey data.
Finally, we investigate whether a voluntary truth-telling oath can be used as a screening
device to disentangle truthful answers from dishonesty. To that end, we implemented an ex-
post truth-telling oath after the survey in the no-oath treatment. Our results show that both
MTurk workers who reported flipping a large number of heads as well as those who did not
carry out the coin-flipping task, were less likely to agree to the ex-post oath. Some workers vol-
untarily self-reported dishonest behavior when they were unexpectedly asked to take an oath
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attesting to the veracity of their completed work. Together, these methods can improve hon-
esty in online labor markets, and data quality in online experiments.
2 Material and methods
Our empirical evidence comes from an online version of the coin-tossing game introduced by
[26]. Our main treatment variable is a truth-telling oath adapted from [33]. The main out-
comes of interest are the distribution of heads reported, and response times.
2.1 Survey implementation
The experiment was administered on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, which is an online platform
that connects employers (or “requesters”) with potential workers. The tasks (called “human
intelligence tasks”, HITs) that MTurk workers (“MTurkers”) complete are typically simple and
straightforward (e.g., answering a questionnaire) and can be completed privately and anony-
mously at any location. This platform has several advantages for the purpose of our study.
The first is representativeness. MTurkers operate in a naturally-occurring labor market and
search for tasks with the goal of earning money. Our subjects answered a call soliciting partici-
pants. This stands in contrast with studies using a phone survey [e.g., 40] whose participants
were not actively seeking opportunities to participate. MTurkers also tend to be more repre-
sentative of the US population than in-person samples such as lab experiments [15].
The second is anonymity. MTurkers are only identified by a user id that cannot be linked to
any personally identifying infor mation. Participants in lab studies, by contrast, are known to
the experimenter even if decisions cannot be linked to an individual. Experimenters also usu-
ally have a direct, face-to-face interaction with subjects during check-in, reading of instruc-
tions and payment. While participants in phone surveys are typically anonymous, the
researcher interacts directly with the subject during all stages, including decision-making,
even though privacy and anonymity are maintained (although subjects do not necessarily
understand it correctly if, for instance, they think the caller might have access to their name
and address thanks to their phone information). The relationship between MTurkers and
employers is fundamentally different because there is no direct personal contact. Employers
post an ad describing the task, and if the worker accepts, then the task begins. Upon comple-
tion by the worker and acceptance by the employer, compensation is made.
Third, because all interactions are highly impersonal, Mturk weakens the connection
between the researcher and the worker as compared to other implementations. This under-
mines the risk of demand effects—i.e., the will of subjects to comply with the experimenter
request rather than providing their own preferred answer [41]. Fourth, for this same reason,
lying behavior on Mturk is interesting on its own as impersonal market institutions like online
labor markets have been hypothesized to foster self-interested non-cooperative behavior [42].
Lying to increase one’s earnings would be consistent with this hypothesis.
2.2 Content of the survey
The experiment was advertised on MTurk and MTurkers could only participate once. The
only restriction on participation was to be at least 18 years old. After agreeing to the task,
MTurkers were redirected to a Qualtrics survey. The first page thanked them for participating,
and elicited informed consent to participate in an academic study. Respondents were informed
they would be paid $1.00 for completing the survey, would have an opportunity to earn addi-
tional money during the survey, and that all of the information obtained would be kept anony-
mous and confidential.
PLOS ONE Crowd-working under oath
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958 January 15, 2021 3 / 18
Coin flipping task. The first screen of the survey reads “Flip a coin 10 times. You will be
paid a bonus of 10 cents per head that is flipped. How many heads did you flip?”. While the mon-
etary reward for lying is small, note that $1.00 amounts to roughly 30 minutes of work for a
typical MTurker—the median wage on MTurk is just $2.00 per hour according to [43]. MTur-
kers were then provided a drop-down menu where they selected their answer from the list of
integers between 0 and 10. Privacy and anonymity, combined with the bonus payment of 10
cents per reported head, create an incentive for MTurkers to report a larger number of heads
than what they actually observed since there are no financial or social consequences for lying.
Demographic survey. After the coin-flipping task, respondents completed a survey which
contained demographic questions and a subset of questions from the World Values Survey.
Consistency check. A common concern with Mechanical Turk is that workers are not
thinking carefully about the questions being asked, or that automated programs (“bots”) that
are designed to mimic human behavior contaminate the results. To address this concern, we
follow [11] and add the following question about halfway through the survey “We want to
make sure you are not a robot. What is the number two plus the number three equal to?”. Those
MTurkers who gave an incorrect answer to this question are dropped from the analysis.
2.3 Treatment variables
Ex-ante oath. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two treatments—OATH and
NOOATH. To avoid possible temporal bias, we released a batch of 200 HITs every two hours
until the budget was exhausted. Upon agreeing to participate in the study, MTurkers in the
OATH treatment were shown a screen that reads “Before we begin, do you swear upon your
honor to answer the following questions truthfully? (You will be allowed to continue with this
survey regardless of your answer to this question)”. In contrast with previous studies of the oath
[e.g., 37, 38] MTurkers were not asked to sign the oath due to the online implementation of
the procedure. Rather, they were asked to simply click “yes” or “no”. While agreeing to the
oath was optional, only two MTurkers did not agree to this oath. Note, the oath was adminis-
tered prior to MTurkers knowing anything about the task at hand, or the financial opportunity
cost associated with being honest. Regardless of how MTurkers answered the oath question,
they move to the next screen, which is the coin flipping task described above. The NOOATH
MTurkers were not presented with the oath screen, and instead went directly to the coin-flip-
ping task. The content of the survey was otherwise exactly the same in both treatments.
Ex post oath. Immediately following the coin-flipping stage, MTurkers in the NOOATH
treatment were exposed to an ex-post oath that reads “Do you swear upon your honor that the
number of heads you reported flipping is truthful? (You will be paid according to the number of
heads you reported flipping regardless of your answer to this question).” MTurkers in the OATH
treatment were instead asked “Did swearing upon your honor to tell the truth affect the number
of heads you reported flipping?”.
2.4 Measures: Lying and shirking
Lying. We define lying as intentionally making a false statement, which in this context
means an MTurker misreported the actual number of heads observed after flipping the coin. A
well-known feature of coin flip experiments is that lying cannot be observed at the individual
level, since all decisions are made in private. Dishonesty can only be measured by comparing
the aggregate outcomes to the truthful distribution—which requires a large enough sample
size for the empirical distribution of draws to be close to the theoretical one. Participants are
asked to perform 10 independent draws from a fair coin flip and to report the average of their
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draws: according to the central limit theorem, the distribution of this sample mean should be
distributed normally, with an expected value equal to 5 and a variance equal to 1/4.
Shirking. We define shirking as the failure to perform the agreed upon task, i.e., not flip-
ping the coin 10 times as instructed. While we do not observe respondents behavior during the
survey, some (but not all) shirking can be detected at the individual level based on the amount
of time an individual spent on the coin-flipping part of the survey. This response time is mea-
sured thanks to a feature embedded in the Qualtrics survey that records how long an individ-
ual spent on each page—i.e., the time in seconds elapsed between the page displays and the
next page appears. This provides a reliable measure of the time spent on the task since MTur-
kers were required to answer each question to proceed to the next one, and were not allowed
to go back and forth in the survey. Also note that, following standard practice, the survey does
not mention the measurement of response times—which minimizes the risk that respondents
manipulate the time they spend on the survey to pretend they performed the task.
To determine the minimum amount of time needed to complete this task, we asked 28 stu-
dents in a large university class to flip a coin that had been provided to them 10 times as
quickly as possible, count the number of heads, and enter the result online in the same way
MTurkers in the experiment reported their answers. The fastest that any student completed
the coin flipping task was 27 seconds, with a mean of 102 seconds. Based on this, we concluded
that it was impossible to complete the task in less than 30 seconds (note that 30 seconds is a
conservative estimate; in the classroom pilot, students already had a coin available and were
prepared to flip before the timer started, whereas for the MTurkers, flipping time also included
time spent getting a coin). One may be concerned that subjects did not have access to a coin
while answering the survey. First note that subjects could have also “flipped” an online coin,
using, e.g., Random.org, or the randomizer app on their smart phone. Such an alternative
procedure is unlikely to save time as it requires three time-consuming steps. First a user enters
an appropriate URL into the search bar (or accesses a mobile phone, unlocks it and opens the
app). Second, the user makes a decision about the number of times a coin should be flipped.
Third, the user must count the number of heads displayed, then enter the result into the Qual-
trics survey. Assuming that the MTurker already knew of a coin-flipping website or had a ran-
domizer app already installed on a phone, it is still highly unlikely that she would have been
able to complete the task within 30 seconds. Second, we surveyed out-of-sample MTurkers
and asked them. “Do you have a coin within reach?’’ Conditional on not having a coin within
reach we then asked them, “Could you get a coin within thirty seconds?” Out of 454 responses,
335 (73.6%) reported having a coin in reach and 415 (91.2%) reported either having a coin in
reach, or said they could get one in less than thirty seconds. Based on this threshold, we can
identify those MTurkers who almost certainly did not complete the task (but we cannot iden-
tify those who certainly did complete it): we define a “quick” response as one that was com-
pleted in less than 30 seconds, and label those workers as “shirkers”. By contrast, a response
that was completed in at least 30 seconds is defined as “slow”. Because the task was done in pri-
vate, we have no way of knowing whether a “slow” MTurker actually performed the task—our
measure based on quick responses thus provides a lower bound on shirking in the task.
2.5 Data
We collected data from 1, 410 MTurkers. Of these, we dropped the 43 (3%) MTurkers who
failed to correctly answer the consistency check question (about what the sum of 2 + 3 equals).
In addition, one MTurker who spent 1, 700 seconds answering the coin flipping question
was dropped to minimize outlier bias when we examine flipping times. This leaves 1, 366
observations (681 in OATH and 685 in NOOATH). Table 1 provides summary statistics on both
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treatments. Across the OATH and NOOATH treatments, MTurkers were predominantly male
(around 60%), white (63%) and physically located in the USA (82%). The average age was 35
(with a standard error equal to 10.7). Across all characteristics, MTurkers in the OATH and
NOOATH treatments were similar.
3 Results
3.1 Do MTurkers shirk and lie?
We first focus on the NOOATH treatment as a baseline to address this question of whether
MTurkers shirk and/or lie. Fig 1 shows the distribution of flipping time by treatment (for
Table 1. Summary statistics.
NOOATH OATH
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Survey outcomes
Heads Flipped 6.331 1 10 6.058 0 10
Flipping Time (s.) 56.87 2.25 971 57.9 2.179 987.057
Duration (s.) 214 53.7 2722 243 49 2057
Consistency check 0.974 0 1 0.964 0 1
Individual characteristics
Male 0.627 0 1 0.593 0 1
Age 35.04 18 82 35.12 18 84
High Income 0.207 0 1 0.234 0 1
Low Income 0.405 0 1 0.417 0 1
US citizen 0.820 0 1 0.825 0 1
White 0.630 0 1 0.627 0 1
Black 0.056 0 1 0.061 0 1
Asian 0.055 0 1 0.057 0 1
Other race 0.202 0 1 0.255 0 1
No Religion 0.490 0 1 0.496 0 1
Hindu 0.124 0 1 0.117 0 1
Catholic 0.127 0 1 0.126 0 1
Protestant 0.162 0 1 0.165 0 1
Other religion 0.258 0 1 0.259 0 1
Questions from the World value survey
Justified Benefits 2.023 0 10 2.020 0 10
Justified Transport 2.420 0 10 2.505 0 10
Justified Steal 1.394 0 10 1.350 0 10
Justified Taxes 1.943 0 10 1.998 0 10
Justified Bribe 1.643 0 10 1.625 0 10
Trust People 0.505 0 1 0.484 0 1
Self-reported church attendance
No Church 0.550 0 1 0.552 0 1
Low Church 0.099 0 1 0.098 0 1
Med Church 0.109 0 1 0.117 0 1
High Church 0.035 0 1 0.036 0 1
N 684 682
Note: Descriptive statistics on the main variables of interest in both treatments. See the S1 Appendix, Section A, for a detailed definition of the variables and the survey.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958.t001
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display purposes, the figure omits those MTurkers who took more than 200 seconds). The verti-
cal line displays the 30s threshold that distinguishes quick from slow responses. The data clearly
indicate that, yes, a nontrivial number of MTurkers did not flip the coin as instructed, and did
shirk: we observe that 42.6% (N = 292) of MTurkers completed the task in less than 30 seconds.
This is comparable to the percent of inattentive MTurkers (42%) documented by [25].
Table 2 provides evidence on lying behavior based on the distribution of reported flips.
Overall, MTurkers reported an average of 6.33 heads and we reject the null hypothesis that this
is less than or equal to the expected mean of five if all reporting were truthful (p = 0.000). Fig 2
displays a more detailed comparison between reported outcomes and the truthful distribution.
As shown in Panel (a), the modal response (N = 298, 21.8%) was six (a small lie if reported dis-
honestly), and 18% of MTurkers (N = 122) reported flipping 10 heads in a row (a “big lie”).
This result is similar to [27] who find that 20% of subjects “lie to the fullest extent possible” in
Fig 1. Flipping time distributions by treatment. Note. Panels (a) and (b) display the empirical distribution of flipping times, by
treatment. A red vertical line is drawn at 30 seconds—the threshold defining shirkers. 35 workers who spent more than 200 seconds
on the coin-flipping question were dropped to construct these figures. Panel (c) reports the QQ-plot of the quantiles of the NOOATH
flipping time distribution (on the x-axis) against the OATH one (on the y-axis).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958.g001
Table 2. Reporting behavior by treatment, and response time.
N Avg Heads Flipped 10 Shirker Flipping Time Duration
Overall (N = 1, 366)
OATH 682 6.06 .129 .400 57.90 243.14
NOOATH 684 6.33 .178 .426 56.87 214.23
p — .008 .006 .170 .389 .002
Shirkers (N = 565)
OATH 273 6.49 .241 — 14.14 221
NOOATH 292 6.79 .291 — 13.62 203
p — .072 .093 — .196 .138
Slow workers (N = 801)
OATH 409 5.76 .053 — 87.17 257
NOOATH 392 5.98 .094 — 89.00 222
p — .041 .014 — .637 .003
Note: The table reports, for the whole sample (top part of the table) and separately for “Shirkers” and “Slow workers” (bottom part), the average number of heads
reported, the share of respondents who report having observed heads 10 times, the share who are classified as quick, the average flipping time and the average time spent
on the remaining of the survey (both measured in seconds) in each treatment. The p-value corresponds to a one-tailed t-test of equality between oath and no oath values.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958.t002
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their die-rolling experiment. Note that the binomial probability of observing 10 heads is 0.1%,
which implies that we should expect to observe this outcome no more than once in our sample
if all MTurkers reported truthfully. If we put this extreme form of lying on the side, and disre-
gard MTurkers who reported flipping 10 heads, the average number of reported heads flipped
is 5.5, which is still statistically different from five (p = 0.000). We therefore conclude that, yes,
on average MTurkers do lie. These lies come in two primary forms: some of these lies are plau-
sible (i.e., reporting six) and others are implausible “big” lies that maximize the worker’s earn-
ings (reporting 10).
This conclusion that MTurkers lie is robust across both the shirkers (i.e., MTurkers who
completed the task in under 30 seconds) and the slow workers for whom the time spent on the
flipping task was sufficient for them to have possibly done the task. As shown in the bottom
part of Table 2, shirkers reported more heads than the slow workers (6.79 vs 5.98, p = 0.000).
Shirkers are also three times more likely to report observing 10 heads (29.1% vs 9.4%, p<.001,
proportion test). Panels (b) and (c) of Fig 2 moreover show that while the modal responses for
shirkers were five and 10, for slow workers the mode was six. Still, the mean number of heads
reported by slow workers is 5.98 (which is significantly different from five, p<.001, and 9.4%
of them reported 10 heads).
3.2 Does an oath reduce shirking and / or lying?
We now examine whether agreeing to a solemn oath causally affects reporting behavior. All
respondents but 2 (0.29%) in the OATH treatment agreed to sign the oath. Table 2 shows the
Fig 2. Heads flipped by flipping time and treatment. Note. Each figure provides the empirical distribution of heads reported,
along with the theoretical truthful distribution. The shaded bars highlight the density of respondents who report having flipped 10
heads. The p-value from Shapiro-Wilk tests of the null hypothesis that each distribution is similar to the normal distribution is<.001
for both the overall distribution and the distribution conditional on the report being lower than 10.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958.g002
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unconditional results. The average number of heads reported flipped by MTurkers in the
OATH treatment was 6.06, which is 4.2% less than the number reported flipped by NOOATH
MTurkers (6.33, p = 0.008). That the mean exceeded five (p = 0.000) indicates that the oath is
not a panacea for truth-telling. The oath also reduced the number of MTurkers who reported
flipping 10 heads in a row by 27% (p = 0.006). In the OATH treatment, 88 MTurkers (12.9%)
reported flipping 10 heads in a row whereas 122 (17.8%) of NOOATH MTurkers did so.
The first column of Fig 2 gives the distribution of heads flipped for OATH and NOOATH
treatments. The “truthful distribution” is provided for comparison purposes (according to
Shapiro-Wilk tests, the equality between the empirical and the theoretical distributions is
rejected for all distributions). The distribution in the OATH treatment is significantly different
from that for the NOOATH treatment (p = 0.10, one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test).
However, dropping MTurkers that reported flipping 10 heads, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the oath had no effect (p = .713). This implies that the oath largely worked by
decreasing the number of MTurkers that told big, obvious, lies which is consistent with the
idea that telling big lies is more costly than telling small lies [44]. The S1 Appendix, Section C,
shows that this change in behavior is unlikely to be due to changes in beliefs about the average
behavior of others.
Table 2 also shows that the oath had little effect on the time MTurkers spent answering the
coin-flipping question. Further, the oath had no effect on the probability an MTurker shirks
(responds to the coin-flipping task in less than 30 seconds). This is confirmed by the empirical
distribution of flipping times provided in Fig 1b, which is very similar to the one in the
NOOATH treatment. To ease the comparison, Fig 1c provides a QQ-plot of the two densities
(which are statistically the same, p = 0.458, KS test). The relationship between the distribution
of flipping time and the share of subjects reporting 10 heads in both treatments confirms the
robustness of these conclusions to the choice of the shirking classification rule; see the S1
Appendix, Section B. However, we do observe that the oath induced MTurkers to spend
approximately 30 additional seconds filling out the survey (net of the time spent on the coin-
flipping task, see Fig 3). This amounts to roughly a 30/214 = 14% increase in survey duration.
Fig 3. Empirical distribution of survey duration, by treatment. Note. The left-hand side figures report the empirical distribution of survey overall
duration, net of flipping time. To ease readability, 13 workers for whom this duration is higher than 1000s were dropped to construct these figures. The
figure on the right-hand side displays the QQ plot of the deciles of the net survey duration in the NOOATH treatment (on the x-axis) against the OATH
one (on the y-axis).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958.g003
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One speculative interpretation for these contrasting findings is that workers view their
responses to survey questions as potentially consequential; their answers may directly influ-
ence any conclusions drawn from the study. In contrast, the coin-flipping task may be viewed
as a time-consuming random number generator that can be costlessly avoided by strategically
picking a number between zero and ten. While admittedly speculative, this theory is echoed by
[25] who write that, “For instance, if respondents to an attitudes survey fail to see the importance
of the survey, they will not be attentive in their responses and will respond in a careless manner,
yielding useless data.” A potentially useful variant of the present study would be to ask subjects
to carry out consequential tasks under oath.
Shirkers certainly did not carry out the task as requested whereas slow workers may have
carried it out. We now examine the effect of the oath separately for these two groups of people.
Table 2 shows that the oath was similarly effective at reducing the number of heads reported
flipped by both shirkers and workers. According to Fig 2, the oath reduced the probability a
shirker reports 10 heads, and increased the probability of reporting five heads. The oath had a
similar effect for slow workers, but for this group the distribution is less bi-modal. However,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the oath had no effect on the distribution of heads
flipped for either shirkers or workers (p = .720, p = .370, KS test of equality between NOOATH
and OATH distributions in each group).
In sum, signing a truth-telling oath induced a dramatic decrease in big lies among both
shirkers and slow workers. It however left unchanged the share of respondents who shirked.
3.3 Heterogeneous responses to the oath
We now turn to the role played by individual characteristics on both dishonesty and the
response to the oath. Given the main lessons drawn in the previous section, we consider sev-
eral outcomes to document dishonesty: the share of subjects who reported having flipped 10
heads in a row, the mean number of heads reported amongst subjects who report a number
lower than 10 and the share of subjects who are classified as shirkers (based on flipping times).
We also include the overall duration of the survey (net of flipping times) in the set of outcomes
so as to asses the robustness of the effect of the oath on this variable.
Table 3 provides the results from Probit and OLS regression models. For each outcome var-
iable, we first look at the heterogeneity in the likelihood of behaving dishonestly, based on
regressions in the NOOATH treatment, and then move to conditional estimates of the effect of
the oath on pooled data from both treatments. The results show that age and gender are the
two main sources of heterogeneity in behavior: being young or male increase the likelihood of
both over-reporting the number of heads flipped and the likelihood of shirking, but increase
the duration of the survey. This large gender difference confirms previous evidence on lying
behavior [e.g., 45, 46]. We also find that US citizens were slightly less likely to tell big lies, and
that lying was more widespread among Catholics and high-income individuals. The estimates
of the effect of the oath conditional on observed heterogeneity confirm the main conclusions
from the raw data: the oath significantly decreased the likelihood of reporting 10 heads, had a
small and statistically insignificant effect on the mean number of heads reported in the remain-
ing sub-sample, left unchanged the likelihood of shirking and significantly increased the over-
all duration of the survey.
This observed heterogeneity in dishonesty raises the question of heterogeneous responses
to the oath. Coin flip experiments are not well-suited to investigate such heterogeneous
responses, since truth-telling can only be observed at the aggregate level. This drastically lowers
the statistical power of the analysis. We thus provide exploratory evidence on this question in
Table 4, which disaggregates the three dishonesty outcomes across individual characteristics
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separately in each treatment (the sample size, reported in Table 1, varies across sub-groups as
observed heterogeneity was not part of the randomization). In all sub-groups, and both treat-
ments, we observe a large share of subjects who shirked and / or reported the maximum num-
ber of heads. Columns (3) and (6) report the mean number of heads reported among subjects
in each sub-group whose report was lower than 10. The mean appears in bold whenever it is
consistent with truth-telling behavior (i.e., the conditional mean is not different from five at
the 10% level, the p-values are provided in the S1 Appendix, Section D). The results in the












NOOATH Pooled NOOATH Pooled NOOATH Pooled NOOATH Pooled
Intercept 0.483 0.002 5.806��� 5.717��� 0.635 0.381 5.460��� 5.199���
0.415 0.993 0.000 0.000 0.140 0.142 0.000 0.000
Age -0.023��� -0.019��� -0.009� -0.011�� -0.019 -0.016��� 0.002 0.003���
0.000 0.000 0.078 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.295 0.004
Male 0.227� 0.188�� 0.053 0.109 0.137 0.140� -0.080�� -0.058��
0.074 0.037 0.664 0.218 0.187 0.053 0.046 0.047
Asian 0.007 -0.342 -0.074 -0.043 0.190 -0.039 -0.092 0.054
0.300 0.138 0.809 0.822 0.558 0.805 0.368 0.402
Black 0.171 -0.122 0.197 -0.049 0.132 -0.060 0.032 0.132�
0.976 0.515 0.487 0.805 0.541 0.691 0.662 0.033
Other race -0.509 0.071 -0.081 -0.370� -0.180 -0.219 0.126 0.153��
0.498 0.695 0.791 0.067 0.421 0.156 0.135 0.011
US Citizen -0.904� -0.420 0.003 0.238 -0.208 -0.084 -0.410��� -0.216��
0.087 0.127 0.993 0.373 0.578 0.684 0.003 0.018
Catholic 0.333� 0.121 -0.005 0.111 0.415��� 0.377��� 0.066 0.070
0.064 0.355 0.979 0.437 0.008 0.000 0.278 0.113
Protestant 0.088 0.181 -0.610 -0.346 -0.183 0.231 0.119 0.141�
0.741 0.365 0.122 0.155 0.465 0.182 0.283 0.074
Hindu 0.063 -0.156 0.294 0.282 0.143 -0.056 -0.032 -0.048
0.810 0.392 0.228 0.096 0.496 0.699 0.672 0.387
Other Religion -0.087 0.029 -0.326 -0.293 -0.027 0.156 0.084 0.094�
0.699 0.849 0.135 0.047 0.879 0.215 0.196 0.065
Low Income 0.070 -0.007 0.162 -0.054 -0.303��� -0.242��� 0.068 0.075��
0.573 0.936 0.232 0.573 0.004 0.001 0.105 0.016
High Income -0.188 -0.050 0.543��� 0.208 -0.131 -0.023 0.065 -0.011
0.342 0.701 0.002 0.104 0.398 0.818 0.218 0.766
Oath — -0.181�� — -0.050 — -0.054 — 0.116���
— 0.033 — 0.568 — 0.436 — 0.000
Note: (1) Probit regression on reporting 10 heads, (2) OLS with robust standard error on the mean number of heads reported conditional on not reporting ten, (3)
Probit on being classified as a shirker based on flipping time, (4) OLS on the overall duration of the survey (net of flipping time). For each outcome variable (N = 684),
the first column provides the regression in the NOOATH treatment, the second column provides estimates on pooled data from both treatments (N = 1, 366). The
reference individual is female, white, and atheist US citizen with medium income. For each variable (in row) the second line provides the p-value of the statistical
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Table 4. Heterogeneity of responses.
NOOATH (N = 684) OATH (N = 682) Δ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Shirking 10 heads Cond. Shirking 10 heads Cond. Shirking 10 heads Cond.
(%) (%) mean (%) (%) mean (%) (%) mean
Individual covariates
30 years old or less 53.125 25.000 5.565 47.212 17.100 5.435 5.913� 7.900�� 0.130
Between 31 and 37 38.776 16.327 5.604 35.897 11.795 5.715 2.878 4.532 -0.111
More than 38 years old 31.500 9.000 5.434 34.862 8.716 5.317 -3.362 0.284 0.117
Male 45.814 20.698 5.572 43.317 14.604 5.539 2.497 6.094�� 0.033
Female 37.402 12.992 5.475 35.252 10.432 5.390 2.150 2.560 0.086
Race other 50.725 27.536 5.170 43.678 11.494 5.279 7.046 16.042�� -0.109
White 40.092 14.977 5.612 39.813 13.817 5.611 0.280 1.160 0.001
Asian 50.000 18.421 5.871 35.897 10.256 5.429 14.103 8.165 0.442
Black 38.462 20.513 5.548 30.952 11.905 5.000 7.509 8.608 0.548
US citizen 40.925 15.125 5.608 38.612 12.811 5.551 2.313 2.313 0.057
Not US citizen 50.820 30.328 5.118 46.667 13.333 5.125 4.153 16.995��� -0.007
Atheist 40.179 15.774 5.654 34.911 13.609 5.555 5.267 2.164 0.099
Catholic 54.023 21.839 5.691 50.000 11.628 5.711 4.023 10.211 -0.019
Protestant 47.619 30.952 4.948 53.086 16.049 5.118 -5.467 14.903� -0.169
Hindu 40.541 13.514 5.573 35.398 7.965 5.481 5.142 5.549 0.092
Religion Other 39.548 13.559 5.464 38.983 10.734 5.373 0.565 2.825 0.091
Low Income 36.331 19.784 5.507 35.563 11.620 5.327 0.768 8.164�� 0.180
Medium Income 49.186 18.241 5.414 43.682 14.440 5.616 5.503� 3.801 -0.202
High Income 40.404 11.111 5.943 42.149 12.397 5.519 -1.745 -1.286 0.424��
Self-reported attitudes
Justified Benefits 48.579 24.289 5.553 49.872 16.624 5.571 -1.293 7.665�� -0.018
Unjustifed Benefits 35.017 9.428 5.513 26.804 7.904 5.362 8.213 1.524 0.151
Justified Transport 46.437 21.609 5.548 47.124 15.708 5.570 -0.687 5.901 -0.021
Unjustified Transport 36.145 11.245 5.511 26.087 7.391 5.310 10.058 3.854 0.201
Justified Steal 47.697 21.711 5.458 50.755 15.710 5.566 -3.058 6.001 -0.108
Unjustified Steal 38.684 14.737 5.590 29.915 10.256 5.397 8.770 4.480�� 0.193�
Justified Taxes 49.180 22.404 5.518 50.667 16.800 5.587 -1.486 5.604� -0.069
Unjustified Taxes 35.220 12.579 5.550 27.036 8.143 5.355 8.184 4.435� 0.196
Justified Bribe 48.765 23.148 5.482 53.890 18.156 5.489 -5.125� 4.993 -0.008
Unjustified Bribe 37.222 13.056 5.575 25.672 7.463 5.465 11.551 5.593� 0.111
Trust People 44.220 15.029 5.432 40.303 12.727 5.444 3.917 2.302 -0.012
Do not trust People 41.124 20.710 5.646 39.773 13.068 5.507 1.352 7.642�� 0.139
No Church 38.727 16.711 5.675 33.777 12.766 5.567 4.950 3.945 0.108
Low Church 51.064 24.823 5.462 45.113 9.774 5.433 5.951 15.048��� 0.029
Med Church 44.776 8.955 5.262 51.471 13.235 5.593 -6.694 -4.280 -0.331
High Church 44.444 18.182 5.284 48.571 17.143 5.115 -4.127 1.039 0.169
Note: Average observed value in both treatments of: (1) and (4) the share of shirkers, (2) and (3) the share of respondents who report 10, (3) and (6) the mean number of
heads reported conditional on the report being lower than 10; by sub-groups defined in row. (7)-(9) report the observed difference between treatments, along with the
statistical significance of the difference; in columns (3) and (5), all values are significantly different from 5 at the 10% unless they appear in bold (see the S1 Appendix,
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NOOATH treatment provide a better understanding of the lying patterns in our sample. First,
the average mean among subjects who did not lie maximally was generally close to five, sug-
gesting that lies in these sub-populations were typically small. Second, reporting behavior was
consistent with truth-telling for a few of these subgroups, in particular protestants [47], and
non-US citizens. This last subgroup is also more likely to report 10 in Table 3 (this is true for
30% of them in the baseline, while the share is only 15% among US citizens), which suggests a
strong self-selection on lying behavior in this sub-group: individuals who lied did it maximally,
while others truthfully reported. The same applies to protestants, among whom 30% lie maxi-
mally while the remaining report truthfully. Interestingly, while the table confirms large differ-
ences in lying behavior according to gender (e.g., 12% of female respondents lie maximally,
while 20% of male respondents do so) neither male nor female respondents who do not lie
maximally truthfully report.
The right-hand side of Table 4 provides the outcomes observed in the OATH treatment
along with the differences between treatments and their statistical significance (the p-values of
all statistical tests are provided in the S1 Appendix, Section D). Both columns (4) and (7) con-
firm a negligible effect of the oath on the likelihood a subject shirked in all sub-groups. By con-
trast, the oath had a dramatic effect on lying behavior through a decrease in the likelihood of
lying maximally by reporting 10 heads. This effect was stronger, and is statistically significant,
in sub-populations in which such big lies were more widespread: young people, males, non US
citizens and low income people. The oath also slightly reduced the share of protestants who
lied maximally, while preserving the truthful reporting behavior of those who did not. Last, for
both Asian and Black people who did not lie maximally, the mean number of heads became
indistinguishable from truth-full reporting when under oath.
The bottom part of the table correlates the outcomes in both treatments with self-reported
attitudes and church attendance. In the baseline, we observe that people who think it is often
justified to cheat, steal, bribe, or fail to pay due taxes were more likely to report a high number
of heads. We similarly find that people who trust others were less likely to report a high num-
ber of heads. The oath again had a stronger effect on the likelihood of lying maximally, and on
the subgroups in which this share was the highest. We do not find any strong correlation
between dishonesty and the frequency of church attendance in the NOOATH treatment—which
might be due to the heterogeneity of religious affiliations in our sample. The oath however had
a significant effect on the likelihood of lying maximally on low church attendance people—the
group in which this share was by far the highest in the baseline. The statistical tests commented
on in the text do not account for multiple testing—the inflation in type I error probability
due to the implementation of several independent tests on the same data. Table E in the S1
Appendix provides the results of a more conservative approach that adjusts the p-values to
account for multiple testing. Based on this approach, the effect of the oath on non-US citizens
and low-church attendance people remains significant at the 10% level.
3.4 Ex-post oath
Immediately after answering the coin-flipping question, NOOATH MTurkers were asked “Do
you swear upon your honor that the number of heads you reported flipping is truthful”. The
acceptance rate is 90% (69 participants out of 685 decided not to sign). The average number of
heads reported in this subgroup is 6.08, which is significantly greater than five (p = .000), but
also significantly lower than the number of heads reported flipped by MTurkers who did not
agree to the ex-post oath, equal to 8.50—a 30% decrease. The difference is again mainly driven
by “big lies”. For example, the share of subjects who report having flipped 10 heads is 62.3% in
the subgroup of respondents who refused to sign the ex-post oath, and 12.8% among the
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remaining NOOATH participants (p<.001, proportion test). Still, we also observe a difference
in ‘small lies’ as the average number of heads conditional on the report being lower than 10 is
6.15 in the first group, and 5.50 in the second one (p = 0.048). Interestingly, the screening
implemented within the NOOATH condition by an ex-post oath achieves outcomes that are
similar to the ones observed in the entire population in OATH: both the proportion of Mturkers
reporting 10 heads and the mean heads flip conditional on the report being lower than 10 are
very similar: 12.9% vs 12.9% (p = 1, proportion test) and 5.50 vs 5.48 (p = .756).
Table 5 reports the results from Probit regressions of the willingness to sign the ex-post
oath on the coin tossing task outcomes, with and without control variables. The results show
that MTurkers who reported flipping a large number of heads were less likely to agree to the
ex-post oath. This result is statistically significant and robust to conditioning on observed
MTurker heterogeneity. We also find that MTurkers who reported flipping 10 heads in a row
were less likely to agree to the ex-post oath—see columns (3) and (4). Interestingly, the effect
of heads flipped remains negative after conditioning its effect on the indicator for flipping 10
heads as well as the indicator for shirking. This implies that even MTurkers who lied a little
(did not report flipping 10 heads) were less likely to agree to the ex-post oath than people who
reported more honest answers. Also, conditional on heads reported flipped, shirkers were less
likely to agree to the ex-post oath—see column (6). This suggests that MTurkers who did not
carry out the coin-flipping task may have viewed their behavior as dishonest, regardless of the
answer they gave. Taken together, these results suggest that asking MTurkers to swear on their
honor following the completion of a task may help identify shirkers and liars.
Table 5. Ex-post oath.
Number of heads Flipped 10 heads Flipping Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heads -0.276��� -0.280��� -0.149�� -0.165��
(.038) (.040) (.071) (.068)
Flipped 10 -1.28��� -1.316��� -0.688�� -0.489





Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Male 0.035 0.045 0.048 0.074
(.155) (.152) (.154) (.157)
White -0.080 -0.110 -0.100 -0.078
(.182) (.183) (.186) (.188)
Black -.059 -0.030 -0.053 -0.067
(.362) (.337) (.351) (.361)
Asian -0.345 -0.422 -0.391 -0.388
(.316) (.315) (.319) (.326)
Constant 3.243��� 3.384 1.664��� 1.822��� 2.699��� 3.21���
(.303) (.492) (.090) (.327) (.540) (.538)
Pseudo R2 .172 .175 .170 .175 .187 .223
Note: Probit regressions on the likelihood that a respondent in NOOATH agreed to the ex-post oath (N = 685).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244958.t005
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4 Conclusion
We test whether workers on a crowd-working platform lie and shirk, and explore whether a
solemn oath to be honest can reduce the prevalence of both. We asked roughly 1, 400 MTurk
workers to flip a coin 10 times and report the number of heads they flipped. They were paid a
bonus of 10 cents for each head reported flipped. In this environment, there is a clear and
direct cost associated with telling the truth. Although we cannot tell whether individual work-
ers told the truth, we can observe whether groups of people lied on average by comparing the
distribution of reports to the underlying truthful distribution. Using response times, we are
also able to identify shirkers individually—those MTurk workers who answered the coin-flip-
ping question too quickly to have actually carried out the task.
We find that MTurk workers both lie (as measured by the distribution of heads reported
flipped) and shirk (measured as the time spent on the coin flipping task). Offering respon-
dents the possibility to sign a truth-telling oath reduces lying, but leaves shirking
unchanged. Whereas workers reported to have flipped 6.33 heads on average in the baseline
survey with no oath, workers under oath reported only 6.05 heads (a statistically significant
reduction of 4.2%). While the magnitude of this change is small on average, the quantitative
effect of the oath is more pronounced when examining “big” lies. MTurk workers who
signed the oath were 27% less likely to report flipping 10 heads in a row (an event we should
observe in less than 0.1% of the cases according to the true distribution). The oath also
induced subjects to spend an additional 30 seconds answering the demographic survey (a
13.5% increase), suggesting the oath caused MTurk workers to answer questions more
thoughtfully and carefully. Finally, we found that an ex-post oath (offered after decisions
are made) is an efficient screening device: in the sub-population who agrees to sign such an
oath, outcomes are behaviorally equivalent to the ones that arise in the entire population
under an ex-ante oath.
It is possible that the failure of the oath to reduce shirking was because workers took an
oath to honesty, rather than an oath to task (i.e., a commitment to actually perform the task as
described). Future research should test whether an “oath to task” can reduce shirking. In addi-
tion, it is possible that one reason we observe a large amount of shirking on the coin-flipping
task, but a significant effect of the oath on the amount of time spent on the survey, is because
workers perceive the survey as meaningful or consequential, whereas reporting the number of
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